The Evolution of Justice in Plato’s Republic: Justice as Self-Mastery
By: Yoana Pehlyova
The exploration of justice launches the beginning of Plato’s Republic. Over the course of Book II to V, the idea of justice is developed to a point that appears somewhat distant from earlier iterations introduced in the Republic. Dr. William Roberts also argues that the conception of justice in Plato’s Republic becomes increasingly radical and contradictory to the ideas of justice introduced prior (Lecture 8, 2020). However, I argue that the idea of justice in Plato’s Republic evolves on a non-contradictory continuum, and that this evolution is neither radical or revolutionary, but rather intuitive and fairly moderate. I will explore this development by first deconstructing Plato’s most evolved iteration of justice (Book V) and then working backwards to understand how all previous notions of justice in The Republic fit together.
In Book V, Plato states that justice in the soul is activated through mechanisms of self-mastery. He examines how self-mastery brings about relational order among the components of the soul: logismos, thumos, and epithumia. Without it, there would be a mere existence of these parts which would at best, confirm the existence of a soul, without necessitating justice within the soul. Justice in the soul is not a part, but rather a function which helps the component parts operate in balance and harmony. It is the intentional act of mastering oneself alongside logismos, thumos, and epithumia that makes the soul just. As previously stated, this iteration of justice, namely justice as self-mastery, is neither radical nor antithetical to previous notions of justice introduced within Plato’s Republic, specifically through Books II to V.
Justice as Self-Mastery: Not Contradictory, but an Addition to Prior Iterations of Justice
This section will outline the evolution of the idea of justice from Books II to V and also make sense of contradictions that plagued its development. In Book II, Socrates introduces the idea of tahatu praten (370 a) which claims that justice is enacted when each individual is self-sufficient and takes care of their own affairs. That is, the labour that is required to sustain an individual is not to be divided with others in the city. Each individual performs all labour that is required to sustain themself. In Book IV, a seemingly contradictory notion of justice via tahatu praten is introduced (423 b) wherein Plato posits that justice derives when each individual does what naturally suits them. For example, if an individual was gifted in one labour field, they would dedicate their time to pursuing that field, and labour would consequently be divided within fields that suit each individual’s respective strengths. Dr. William Roberts argues that these iterations of justice are contradictory to one another because self-sufficiency is fundamentally antithetical to the division of labour based on strengths.
In Book IV, Plato also introduces the idea that justice is located in the soul, as it is located in the city, and moreover that the virtues in the soul may look like the virtues in the city. To explain, the soul has the same forms as the city does: logismos, thumos, and epithumia. Logismos, the ruling form, is the part of the soul that loves learning, calculation, logic, and rationality. Thumos, is the fighting form of the soul, and epithumia is the desiring form of the soul; the part that loves things and more concretely, useful things. It is centrifugal, therefore it has the power to pull individuals in many different directions. By defining the three parts of the soul, it becomes clear that they do not function independently, but are relationally linked. Logismos, the ruling form of the soul, is central in one’s pursuit of desire (epithumia) through the mechanism of priority. Once priority is declared, an individual has a path, and it is thumos, which preserves and defends what logismos declares. Considering these parts as a whole, moderation occurs when logismos, thumos, and epithumia are in harmony with one another, by allowing logismos to lead. When logismos leads, balance is maintained among the three parts and the good of the whole soul is secured. The idea that logismos is used to lead the components of the soul is fundamental to the evolving idea of justice developed in Book V.
In Book V, Plato posits that justice via tahatu praten is enacted when each individual does whatever they can to be the best human being that they can be (453 b). It is the one duty everyone has to the city and to themselves: to ensure that each person is the best version of themselves. This task is fulfilled through logismos’ lead, which determines what one should do and which path to pursue. Justice in the soul, according to this iteration, is therefore, an intentional act, very naturally likened to the practice of self-mastery (that is, knowing oneself and doing what is best for oneself). Book V argues that while justice is located in the soul, it is not a component part in the same way that logismos, thumos, and epithumia are, but rather an intentional act which surrenders to the lead of logismos, and balances all component parts of the soul. Only then can justice in the soul be generated.
How do these iterations of justice work on a continuum?
Thus far, we have been introduced to three iterations of justice. Book II advocates for a justice that is self-sustaining at the individual level, while Book IV argues for justice via a division of labour based on skill. Finally, Book V explores justice in the soul as an individual’s commitment to self-mastery. At first glance, these iterations seem separate and disconnected. How can justice be self-sustaining (Book II), but also a division of labour (Book IV), and a function in the soul that is only activated through self-mastery? What do these ideas of justice have in common, and more importantly, how do these ideas evolve from one another?
These iterations of justice work in tandem to one another in the following ways. Book IV does not introduce a contradictory notion of justice to that of Book II. It does not advocate for the complete dependence on others, but instead adds that being self-sufficient is a way to pursue justice in certain contexts, while in others, it may be more beneficial for the city and individual to focus more on what one is best at. In this way, justice is contextual. It is based on what produces the greatest good within a specific context. In Book II, the idea of justice is a very primitive concept. It’s used to refer to survival, both at the individual (ie. sustaining yourself and your family) and city level (ie. sustaining the economy). In early iterations of rural western societies, self-sufficiency was the best way to pursue justice — given the specific context. However, contexts evolve and change. When this happens, such as changes in the population, economic structure or norms of a city, so too does our idea of what justice is. Our knowledge of the context also evolves, and with that, comes reflection on past actions that were previously thought to serve the greatest good. This does not mean that these actions were unjust, as justice must be evaluated within a specific context. It also doesn’t mean that Plato’s iteration of justice (as self-sufficiency) in Book II is contradictory to that of Book IV. Justice is contextual and earlier iterations are needed in order to unlock the “greatest” justice that is ie. self-mastery.
Book V argues that justice is self-mastery, and I believe this falls along the continuum of justice. Earlier conceptions of justice are not contradictory to later conceptions, but rather needed in order to reach a point where justice could be expressed through self-mastery. All conceptions of justice fall on this continuum as justice is an expansive concept that evolves with context and our understanding of context.
Figure 2. The Continuum of Justice according to context
If justice exists on a continuum, then self-mastery resides at a further point. Evidently, our pursuit of justice expands when our knowledge of ourselves and our community deepens. Justice is self-sufficiency, and it is doing what one is best at, and it is also self-mastery. The “level” of justice that is pursued depends on where an individual is on their personal journey, and what makes most sense for the greatest good of the individual and the city. Therefore, Books II, IV, and V do not completely transform nor contradict the notion of what justice demands, but rather explore a series of steps or ‘levels’ in which the individual (or the city as a collective) must ‘unlock’ or pass through in order to pursue a deeper, self-informed justice. This iteration implies that justice in the soul is not static, nor is it an element like logismos, thumos, or epithumia are. Instead, it is an intentional act which relates the three parts following logismos’ lead.
Justice as Self-Mastery: Not Radical, but an Intuitive & Moderate Argument
Dr. William Roberts states that justice goes from being a fairly conservative virtue at the beginning of Book V to a radical one at the end of Book V (Lecture 8, 2020). I argue that justice continues unfolding alongside a non-contradictory, context-specific continuum where individuals are able to expand their ideas and practice of justice. Because of this, I do not believe that the iterations of justice presented in Book V are radical, but rather, intuitive and moderate. This section will explore how ‘justice as self-mastery’ does not change the fundamental nature of what justice demands or demanded in the Books prior. It is instead an intuitive succession which deepens and expands on the previous conceptions of justice.
“Justice as self-mastery” makes sense in practice. One can have all the component parts of the soul, but without self-knowledge and self-control to activate those parts, the individual is limited in their pursuit towards their highest attainment. One must know how to use each part of the soul in a way that is best suited for them. That is, one must pursue self-mastery in order to pursue justice. Consequently, being just means being a master of oneself. The best part of an individual (one’s mind ie. logismos) masters over everything else, and one lives rationally and according to the dictates of reason. In this way, the pursuit of justice is a natural, worthwhile, and individually self-interested thing to do, which intersects with the pursuit of self-mastery. After each individual pursues justice in the way Book IV dictates (ie. each individual in the city does what only they are skilled in), the concept of justice expands. We reach a “now what?” point where there is still injustice in the city, and thus, still deeper levels of justice to pursue. It makes sense that once a city functions well, the next thing is to call upon its individual to look inwards. Thus, justice as self-mastery or “being the best you you can be” is not radical, but an intuitive succession of the previous iteration of justice introduced in Book IV. It is also a fairly moderate continuation of the justice continuum because it asks not that we take care of everything and everyone, but only that we try to do our best to understand ourselves. In my eyes, this is pretty fundamental to justice, whether argued by a group of philosophers in the Republic or a college student. Be the best you can be. Whatever that means for you.
Concluding Remarks
In summation, there is an inherent link between one’s pursuit of justice and one’s pursuit of self-mastery. So much so that at one point, self-mastery exists on the continuum of justice. This is neither a contradictory nor radical claim, but rather one that expands naturally from the previous iterations of justice presented in Plato’s Republic. Deconstructing all of these iterations of justice and understanding that it is an evolving concept, I can’t help but wonder: what is the future of our conception of justice? What will be considered “just” in the future?
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Works Cited
Plato, The Republic of Plato, translated by Allan Bloom, Harper Collins/Basic Books
